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Reviewed by Neil Tennant∗
This book is written so as to be ‘accessible to philosophers without a math-
ematical background’. The reviewer can assure the reader that this aim is
achieved, even if only by focusing throughout on just one example of an
arithmetical truth, namely ‘7+ 5= 12’. This example’s familiarity will be
reassuring; but its loneliness in this regard will not. Quantified propositions
— even propositions of Goldbach type — are below the author’s radar.
The author offers ‘a new kind of arithmetical epistemology’, one
which ‘respects certain important intuitions’ (p. 1)1: apriorism, realism,
and empiricism. The book contains some clarification of these ‘isms’,
and some thoughtful critiques of major positions regarding them, as
espoused by such representative figures as Boghossian, Bealer, Peacocke,
Field, Bostock, Maddy, Locke, Kant, C.I. Lewis, Ayer, Quine, Fodor, and
McDowell. The philosophical reader will find some interest and value in
these wider-ranging discussions. Our concern in this review, however, is
to examine closely the original positive proposal on offer.
Arithmetical truths, the author maintains, are conceptual truths. Know-
ing truths like 7+ 5= 12 involves no ‘epistemic reliance on any empirical
evidence’; but that, she says, is not to claim ‘epistemic independence of the
senses altogether’. She wants to show that
experience grounds our concepts . . . and then mere conceptual exam-
ination enables us to learn arithmetical truths (p. 4).
Concepts that are ‘appropriately sensitive’ to ‘the nature of [an indepen-
dent] reality’ she calls grounded. Because of the role of grounded concepts,
‘arithmetical truths explain our arithmetical beliefs in the right sort of way
for those beliefs to count as knowledge’ (p. 9).
In the context of her concentration on the special nature of arithmeti-
cal knowledge, the author offers (in Chapter 3) what could strike some
bystanders as an unnecessarily over-ambitious account of knowledge tout
court. Knowledge, for the author, is
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true belief which can be well explained, to someone not acquainted
with the details of the subject’s situation (an ‘outsider’), just by citing
the proposition believed. (p. 74)
Clearly this proposal places an enormous burden on the notion of expla-
nation. Space does not permit the reviewer to develop in detail any of
the obvious counterexamples (both empirical and mathematical) to this
account of knowledge. Those conversant with post-Gettier epistemology
will readily think up such counterexamples for themselves.
The heart of the work is Chapter 4, ‘A theory of arithmetical knowl-
edge’. The author believes (p. 109) that ‘arithmetical propositions can
sometimes be good explanations of why we have the arithmetical beliefs
we do’. But surely this is not good enough. She ought to be asserting
that every one of our arithmetical beliefs can be explained by citing the
proposition believed, if her general account of knowledge is to be faith-
fully applied. (Indeed, as we shall see below, she does eventually make the
more general assertion; but subsequently retracts it.)
Setting aside this problem of scope, let us examine the author’s account
of how it is that an arithmetical fact p can supposedly explain a subject’s
belief that p.
I shall hypothesize that this kind of explanatory link holds in virtue
of three sub-links, one between the arithmetical facts and our sen-
sory input, one between our sensory input and our arithmetical con-
cepts, and one between our arithmetical concepts and our arithmeti-
cal beliefs. (p. 116)
The links are never explained.
When we attempt to conceive of something’s being the case, what
we are doing is investigating how our conceptual representations fit
together. . . . When we attempt to conceive of 7+ 5 not being equal
to 12, we investigate whether our concepts of 7, 5 and 12 are concepts
as of things that stand in the relation denoted by our concept · · · +
· · · = . . . [.] We find that they are, and hence report that we cannot
conceive of 7+ 5 not being equal to 12 (or, sometimes, just that 7+
5= 12, and/or that necessarily 7+ 5= 12). (p. 123)
The method, then, appears to be to try to conceive of not-p’s being the
case; finding (upon investigation or examination) one cannot conceive this;
and thereupon concluding that p. Once again, the author’s restrictive focus
on simple computational statements, all of which are decidable, results
in her not being aware of an obvious counterexample to her suggested
epistemic path to a grasp of necessary arithmetical truth. Can one conceive
the negation of the consistency statement for Peano arithmetic? Yes, one
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can, and one can do so consistently with Peano arithmetic, provided only
that Peano arithmetic is itself consistent. This contradicts her view; for
her method as stated above does not give the right result (namely, that the
consistency statement for Peano arithmetic is true).
As the title of the book suggests, the notion of grounding is central
to the author’s account. It is introduced via a sequence of definitions, the
most important ones of which we shall now quote. It will be shown that
her exercise in framing definitions is to no productive effect.
(6) I shall say that a concept refers iff it is a representation of some
real feature of the world. . . . a property may be a real aspect of the
world even when nothing has that property, and even when necessar-
ily nothing has it. (p. 126)
From this it presumably follows that the concept ‘unicorn’ refers, in the
sense of ‘refers’ here defined, as does the concept ‘non-self-identical’.
(9) Fitting concepts are concepts which either refer themselves or
else are correct compounds of referring concepts . . . (p. 127)
Next:
(10) . . . Given some purported a priori knowable proposition p, we
can say that a concept C is relevantly accurate (or, sometimes, just
accurate) iff C is fitting and neither C nor any concept from which
C is composed misrepresents its referent in any respect relevant to
our purported a priori way of knowing that p. (Note that which con-
cepts count as ‘relevantly accurate’ depends on which item(s) of a
priori knowledge we are interested in.) (pp. 127–128; third emphasis
added)
The author admits that she is ‘not entirely clear on what it would be for a
concept to misrepresent its referent’. So she allows that for
those who do not think that a concept can misrepresent its referent,
all fitting concepts will automatically count as [relevantly] accurate
. . . and all . . . inaccuracy will amount to unfittingness. That is fine
by me. (p. 128)
Let us take the author’s concession seriously, then, and set aside the specter
of conceptual misrepresentation, in this more limited context of a discus-
sion of arithmetical concepts.
The question now arises: what are we to make of the mention of the
purported a priori knowable proposition p in definition (10)? The sec-
ond conjunct on the right-hand side becomes trivially true upon assuming
that no concepts misrepresent their referents. So that conjunct contributes
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nothing to the definition of relevantly accurate concepts. Hence it can be
suppressed. Definition (10) then becomes
(10*) . . . Given some purported a priori knowable proposition p, we
can say that a concept C is relevantly accurate (or, sometimes, just
accurate) iff C is fitting.
One is then left wondering what connection is being assumed between
p and C, and why the clause ‘Given . . . p’ remains in place at all. The
author’s parenthetical note that
which concepts count as ‘relevantly accurate’ depends on which
item(s) of a priori knowledge we are interested in
also becomes otiose, if not nonsensical, in this new context where the
possibility of conceptual misrepresentation is ruled out. So, (10*) boils
down to
(10**) A concept C is relevantly accurate (or, sometimes, just accu-
rate) iff C is fitting.
The author’s next definition is as follows.
(11) A concept is grounded just in case it is relevantly accurate and
there is nothing lucky or accidental about its being so. (p. 128)
By this stage one is also wondering what the adverb ‘relevantly’ could
be contributing, since there does not seem to be any a priori knowable,
parametric, proposition p left in the context (vide (10**)), with respect to
which the concept in question could be at all relevant.
From (10**) it follows by (11), (9), and (6) that a concept is grounded
just in case it represents some real feature of the world or is a correct com-
pound of concepts that represent some real feature of the world and there
is nothing lucky or accidental about its doing so. This does not strike one
as saying much. The author does not oblige the reader with any paradigm
examples, or foils, of the notions being deployed (fittingness, grounding,
etc.). Indeed, on p. 180 one learns that ‘examples of ungrounded concepts
are hard to find’. This is perhaps not surprising, on reflection, since the
definition of groundedness, as unwound above, seems to impose hardly
any significant constraints on concepts in general.
Concept grounding is important, the author tells us, because
examining grounded concepts can help us acquire knowledge of [the
world]. (p. 131)
This promissory note is subsequently expanded:
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If our concepts are sensitive to sensory input and hence the world,
in such a way that they (or their ultimate constituents) are likely
to represent real aspects of the world in an accurate way, then an
examination of those concepts is no longer just an examination of
ourselves, but becomes an examination of a reliable on-board con-
ceptual map of the world. And if this is the case, we have reason
to think that propositions believed solely on the basis of such an
examination can supply us with knowledge of the independent world.
. . . concepts can give us access to some truths about the world, . . .
most importantly for our current purposes, the truths of arithmetic.
(pp. 134–135; emphases added)
One hastens to ask: Which truths of arithmetic? All of them? Or just the
axioms of Peano? Or just the quantifier-free truths? Or just the true sen-
tences with no unbounded quantifiers? By this stage (the midpoint of the
work) the reader is owed at least one detailed account of how a conceptual
‘examination’ can be carried out, so as to arrive at knowledge of an exem-
plary arithmetical truth. The reader is owed an account of exactly which
concepts, for the purpose of such an exercise, are taken to be grounded; and
how they might deliver up arithmetical knowledge upon the right kind of
examination. The reader wishes to know whether quantifier-free computa-
tional statements (the only sorts of examples considered in this book) are
the only arithmetical truths that will succumb to such an ‘aprioristic yet
empiricist’ treatment; or whether the author has the wherewithal to deal
also with the Go¨del phenomena, once quantification over all the natural
numbers is admitted.
The reader, however, is left in the dark concerning such questions. The
second half of the book proceeds without any concern for what by this
stage will be the most importantly unanswered questions in the reader’s
mind. From this point on, also, there are some textural tones that tend to
belie the author’s confident architectonic impulses. With notable frequency
one encounters such hedges as ‘I am not entirely clear on what it would be
for . . . ’ (p. 128), ‘If I were forced to guess, I would say it was likely that
. . . ’ (p. 157), ‘I have not, of course, said enough here to count as having
given a serious argument . . . ’ (p. 177).
The reader looking for answers to these questions will be disappointed
on reaching the author’s eventual admission that
I have not said anything substantial about the way in which examin-
ing the concepts leads to possession of the belief. I have not said how
we go about conducting an ‘examination’ of our concepts, nor how
and why the examination process leads us to adopt certain beliefs and
not others. I have not said how it is that we can tell by examining our
concepts of 7, +, 5, =, and 12 that they stand in a certain relation, or
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[how] our noticing this leads to our believing that 7+ 5= 12. . . . I
am not offering a worked-out account of this process. (pp. 246–247)
She explains her failure, or principled reluctance, to pursue such mat-
ters as follows:
Attempting to describe the processing stages of concept examina-
tion in detail would be akin to attempting to describe the processing
stages involved in visual perception: not immediately relevant to the
epistemological issues we’re focussing on, and not the sort of thing
that should be done a priori by a philosopher without input from
empirical psychology. (p. 248)
Mathematicians arrive at their known truths of mathematics by a priori
means, namely deductive proofs based on intuitively evident axioms. Nev-
ertheless, it would appear that the author is telling us that the real reason
why mathematicians can be regarded as knowing these truths is that a cer-
tain kind of empirical investigation could be undertaken, an investigation
that must involve the participation of empirical psychologists.
It would be better if this claim were confined only to what the mathe-
matician calls ‘first principles’, i.e., axioms; but nowhere does the author
limit her claim about provenance to the axioms. Indeed, in the usual Peano
axiomatization, ‘7+ 5= 12’ is not an axiom, but a theorem. So, if the
author is correct in her view, the average mathematician will be left star-
ing at any convincingly rigorous proof of a theorem p, wondering how on
earth he could be so wrong (concerning his grounds for knowing p). For
the author is telling him that it is not his understanding of the proof that
secures him his knowledge that p, but rather some sort of examination of
his concepts, concepts which are somehow grounded in his sensory input.
Yet for all that, the author concedes
I have not attempted to give a full account of grounding for concepts,
or even for arithmetical concepts. I have not even given a full account
of what a concept is, or what arithmetical concepts are like. And
I have not given anything like a full account of conceptual examina-
tion. . . . I have not asked what sorts of pre-conceptual sensory input
could ultimately ground our arithmetical concepts, and I have not
attempted to give any details of the relationship between this input
and our arithmetical concepts in virtue of which the latter count as
grounded in the former. (p. 260)
Perhaps most disappointing is the author’s failure to appreciate the
scope and profundity of the extant tradition of both logicism and neo-
logicism. She pays scant regard to the intuitions behind logicism. Nowhere
does she anticipate or address an imagined anti-empiricist opponent (in her
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sense of ‘empiricist’) who appeals to the logical possibility of a disembod-
ied Cartesian soul in a universe containing no material objects. It is easy
to provide a convincing thought-experimental account of how such a soul
could attain to at least the axioms of Peano arithmetic (indeed: even at sec-
ond order). The strategy of course is Fregean in spirit (if not in the details
of its logical execution), and it is a priori in the strict traditional sense.
Moreover it is independent, not only of empirical evidence, but also of
any concepts that might be empirical in their acquisition or grounding.
So, the unaddressed question arises for the author’s brand of aprioris-
tic empiricism: why have you ignored this time-honored form of logicist
reflection on the logically possible purely logical provenance of our con-
cept of natural number? Is it not this that makes arithmetical knowledge a
priori? — rather than some (obscure and unexplained) form of ‘ground-
ing’ of arithmetical concepts in ‘sensory input’? In light of the logicist
tradition, and all that it has accomplished, is it not over-hastily dismissive
to write that
. . . there is no reason to suppose that [the concepts 7, +, 5, =, and
12] could be grounded without reliance on sensory input (p. 150)?
We adverted above to an appearance of slight strain between two assertions
in the work. The first of these is confidently sweeping:
. . . arithmetical truths are conceptual truths; or, at least, enough arith-
metical truths are conceptual truths to enable us to account for all
of our a priori arithmetical knowledge once we add in knowledge
secured by inference from other truths known in this way. (p. 123;
emphasis added)
But, thirty pages later the author retracts:
To account for all of our knowledge of arithmetic is a tough call,
even when we allow that much can be achieved by deduction from
previously known arithmetical facts. Go¨del’s incompleteness results
are a measure of how tough a call this is. (p. 153)
One is left with the misgiving that this was a work conceived and exe-
cuted with an eye only to Kant’s famous example (‘7+ 5= 12’), which
subsequently had to be hedged and qualified as soon as an expert critic
drew attention to Go¨delian incompleteness (for, surely, any epistemology
for arithmetic must be able to deal with quantified sentences).
Readers of this journal are unlikely to be persuaded by this brand of
empiricist apriorism, interesting though the prospects for some account
of that kind might be. The details of execution are neither adequate nor
convincing. The author observes that ‘The approach I am advocating does
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not seem to have been considered before’ (p. 199). If her account, as here
executed, turns out to be the only possible one of this kind, then we have an
explanation, perhaps, as to why it has not been considered before — despite
the author’s anticipation of extensions of her account to ‘other kinds of a
priori knowledge like knowledge of other parts of mathematics, and of
logic’ and ‘even . . . ethics’ (p. 265).
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